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ADOPTED CHILD AS "HEIR'
In the recent case of Major v. Kammer' the testator left a will,
probated May 2, 1904, which provided:
...

I do hereby give and bequeath ... to the Louisville Trust Com-

pany for the use and benefit of Jennie Farrell, during her life, with
remainder to her heirs at law; the income from said property to be
paid to said Jennie Farrell.2

Jennie Farrell, the life beneficiary died on February 9, 1952, leaving
as her heirs a natural daughter and two daughters who were adopted
on October 27, 1936. The question presented to the court was whether
a devise to one for life with remainder to the heirs at law of the life
beneficiary includes children adopted by the life beneficiary subsequent to the testator's death. The court in a very able opinion held
that the adopted children were within the class designated as "heirs
at law."
In reaching this decision the court had to decide whether the
1904 adoption statute3 in effect at the testator's death, or the 1950
statute4 in effect at the death of the life tenant should control.
In the past, adopted children have met with much difficulty in
qualifying as "heirs" under a will limited to the "heirs of the adoptive
parents." Much of this difficulty stemmed from the 1904 adoption
statute which provided:
Any person twenty-one years of age, may, by petition filed in the
circuit court of the county of his residence, state, in substance, that he
is desirous of adopting a person, and making him capable of inheriting
as heir-at-law of such petitioner; and said court shall have authority
to make an order declaring such person heir-at-law of such petitioner,
and as such, capable of inheriting as though such person were the
child of such petitioner; but no such order shall be made if the
petitioner be a married man or woman, unless the husband or wife

join in the petition.
Under this statute the court would have had to face the further
problem of choosing between two contrary rules of construction for
determining the intention of the testator when he made the devise.
The first rule, which appears in the earlier Kentucky cases, is that
adopted children cannot take property limited by deed or will to the
heirs of the adoptive parents, unless an intention to include them appears from the language of the instrument.5 It seems perfectly clear
'258 S.W. 2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
Ibid.
Ky. STAT. see. 2071 (1904).
'KY. REV. STAT. 199.530 (1953).
'CARuoLL's

'Eversole v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 298 Ky. 321, 182 S.W. 2d. 392 (1944);

Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. 2d. 680 (1940).
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that under this interpretation it would be impossible for a subsequently
adopted child to be included within the class unless the testator
specifically so provided.
A second rule later announced in the case of Isaacs v. ManningG
was to the effect that an adopted child clearly falls within the description "heirs" where no language showing a contrary intention appears
from the instrument. The court did not, however, overrule the previous
cases which were decided in the light of the first rule of construction.
This was probably due to the fact that the cases could be distinguished,
in that all the cases applying the first rule involved adoptions subsequent to the testator's death, while the adoption in the Manning case
took place prior to the death of the testator and the drawing of the
will. These cases have been so distinguished in a note in the Kentucky
7
Law Journal.
This 1904 statute was repealed in 1940,8 but its repeal did not
prevent it from fixing the rights of adopted children, because the
Court of Appeals had been of the opinion that the statute in effect at
the death of the testator would be the one by which the will would be
construed. Therefore, when a case was presented where the testator
died prior to 1940 and the life tenant died after this date, the 1904
statute would be applied. The Manning case was decided after the
repeal of the 1904 statute. There, however, the court, refusing to follow such an artificial construction of the word "heirs," took a more
liberal attitude than it had in the earlier cases, and announced the
second rule of construction, as stated above.
The 1950 statute in effect today is for all practical purposes the
same as the repealing statute of 1940 and the 1946 enactment on
adoption. It provides:
Any child adopted pursuant to the provision of K.R.S. 199.470 to
199.520 shall be considered, for the purpose of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations, the natural, legitimate
child of the parents adopting it ....

In the case of Kolb v. Ruhrs Adm'r,'0 decided under the 1940 enactment, it was held that a child adopted in 1930 could inherit from the
cousin of the adoptive parents where the cousin died in 1945. This
was an indication that adopted children were to be the same as
:312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W.2d 418 (1950).
6 Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 335 (1951).
Cmmou's Ky. STAT. sec. 2071-2072b, repealed in 1940; Ky. Ray. STAT. sections 405.140-405.240, provisions for adoption, repealed in 1946; Ky. REv. STAT.
sections 405.240-405.280, provisions for adoption, repealed in 1950, effective June
15, 1950; Ky. Rxv. STAT. sections 199.470-199.590, adopted in 1950, effective
June 15, 1950.
'Ky. REv. STAT. 199.530 (1) (1953).
"°303 Ky. 604, 198 S.W. 2d 326 (1946).
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natural children and would be classed with them unless by will or
some other instrument they were excluded. In the principal case, the
court stated that the 1950 statute, if it were used to determine the
intention of the testator, would allow adopted children to be included
within the term "heirs-at-law" of the adoptive parents.
It was contended, however, that since the testator died in 1904,
the holding in Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co." controlled the
principal case, and the statute in effect at the testator's death should
be used to determine membership in the class described as "heirs."
12
The court, however, refused to follow this part of the Copeland
opinion, and held that in determining membership in the class described as "heirs" of the life tenant, the statute in effect at the death
of the life tenant would control. Therefore, since the life tenant in
the principal case died in 1952, the 1950 statute, in effect at her death,
was used to construe the will, and the adopted children were allowed
to share in the property left by the testator. By the specific holding
in the principal case the court was not compelled to use the 1904
statute and its opposing rules of construction.
The case represents an important clarification on the status of
adopted children, in accepting what is believed to be the preferable
definition of the terms "heirs" and "heirs-at-law" as including adopted
children. It would now seem that the 1904 statute with its contrary
rules of construction is at long last dead. No longer can it plague the
adopted child as it has since its enactment, and no longer will it rule
from the grave as it has since its repeal.
JAms T. YOUNGBLOOD

TESTAMENTARY GIFTS TO AMENDABLE TRUSTS
The question of whether a testator can ever devise or bequeath a
portion of his estate to an amendable inter vivos trust is not one that
can be readily and conclusively answered. When the bequest is to an
amendable trust which has in fact been amended subsequent to the
execution of the will, a further and even more perplexing problem
arises. No American jurisdiction has as yet allowed property to pass
into a trust which has been amended after the execution of the will,
unless such amendments meet the formal requirements of the Statute
of Wills. It has been suggested that perhaps the law in this respect
should be changed by passing a statute allowing a formally executed
1300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. 2d 1017 (1945).
Supra note 1 at 508.

